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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 06-3791

MUBASHIR FAZIL,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent

On Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A79-708-046)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie Garcy

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 23, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 9, 2008)

OPINION

PER CURIAM
Petitioner, Mubashir Fazil, petitions for review of a final order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.
Fazil is a citizen and native of Pakistan who entered the United States in

November 2000 with a B-2 visa. He was charged as an overstay and placed in removal
proceedings on February 13, 2003. Fazil thereafter requested asylum, withholding of
removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In an interlocutory
decision, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied the asylum application as untimely. At a
subsequent merits hearing, Fazil’s attorney withdrew the request for CAT relief and
proceeded solely on the application for withholding of removal. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the IJ denied Fazil the requested relief.
While the IJ noted concern regarding the plausibility of some of Fazil’s stories and
the veracity of parts of his testimony, she did not render an adverse credibility
determination. Instead, the IJ concluded that Fazil was not entitled to withholding of
removal because he failed to establish that the persecution he fears in the future is on
account of any protected ground. The IJ noted that the only possible applicable ground
would be on account of political opinion. Although the Supreme Court recognized the
possibility of imputed political opinion in INS v. Elias Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992),
the IJ nonetheless determined that Fazil failed to establish this ground as well.
Accordingly, Fazil was denied relief in the form of withholding of removal, but was
granted voluntary departure.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision in an order dated October 17, 2005. The BIA
stated that “[e]ven assuming, without deciding, that [Fazil] testified credibly, we find that
[Fazil] failed to establish a ‘clear probability’ of persecution on account of a protected
ground.” See BIA Order at 1.
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Fazil thereafter filed a motion to reopen/remand with the BIA. In that motion,
Fazil asserted that he had married a United States citizen on June 7, 2004, that his wife
had filed an I-130 petition on his behalf on June 14, 2004, and that the petition was still
pending. Citing Matter of Velarde, 23 I&N Dec. 253 (BIA 2002), Fazil offered the
pending I-130 petition as a basis for reopening the proceedings to allow him to seek
adjustment of status. Fazil further asserted that reconsideration of the BIA’s order of
dismissal was warranted given the evidence of harm to petitioner’s brother and the
attempted kidnapping of his children – acts which, according to Fazil, demonstrate that
the extremist group he fears is still active in Pakistan and is a group over which the
government is unable or unwilling to exercise control.
Fazil’s motion to reopen fared no better than his original appeal and was denied by
the BIA in an order dated February 15, 2006. The BIA concluded that its decision in
Matter of Velarde was not pertinent to Fazil’s case given the fact that he knew his visa
application was pending when the proceedings were still with the IJ, yet he failed to
pursue the requested relief at that time or to request any other action. See BIA Order at 1,
citing transcripts at 49-52. Additionally, the BIA concluded that reopening under the
holding in Velarde was not warranted as Fazil’s motion was not supported by a completed
adjustment application or sufficient evidence of the bona fides of the marriage. The BIA
further determined that Fazil was not entitled to reconsideration of its determination
finding him ineligible for withholding of removal given his failure to identify any error in
the IJ’s finding, that he failed to demonstrate that any of the harm he allegedly
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experienced was on account of a protected ground, and given his failure to address noted
concerns regarding the veracity of his claim.
Fazil, through counsel, filed a timely petition for review with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit together with a motion for a stay of removal.
Upon stipulation of the parties and in accordance with INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(2), the Second Circuit transferred the petition to this Court in light of the fact that
the administrative proceedings were conducted and completed by an IJ sitting in Newark,
New Jersey. We previously denied Fazil’s stay motion and his petition for review is now
ripe for disposition.
Fazil limits his petition for review to a challenge of the BIA’s denial of his
reconsideration motion and its original conclusion that he failed to establish that he is
being targeted on account of an imputed political opinion. Initially, we note our
agreement with respondent’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of
Fazil’s withholding of removal claim because he did not timely appeal the BIA’s decision
of October 17, 2005. See INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Thus, our review
extends only to the BIA’s order denying Fazil’s motion seeking reconsideration. See
Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995); Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (3d Cir.
1986).
A motion for reconsideration must “specify the errors of law or fact in the previous
order and shall be supported by pertinent authority.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(b)(1). Regulation 1003.2(a) provides that the “decision to grant or deny a
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motion to ... reconsider is within the discretion of the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).
Accordingly, we review the BIA’s determination with respect to Fazil’s motion with
“broad deference” to its decision. Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir.
2003). In order to succeed on the petition for review, Fazil must show that the BIA’s
discretionary decision was somehow arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. See Tipu v.
INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994). After careful review, we must conclude that the
BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Fazil’s motion. See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d
127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001).
Fazil’s reconsideration motion – which, we note, was not filed by current counsel
– falls far short of specifying errors of law or fact in the BIA’s previous order and is so
lacking in pertinent authority that we would be hard pressed to conclude that the BIA
acted arbitrarily, irrationally or contrary to law by denying it. Respondent accurately
points out that Fazil’s most relevant argument presented to the BIA in his reconsideration
motion involves his contention that “[t]he Immigration Judge failed to take administrative
notice of the fact that said group is influential with the masses, operates nationwide, and
is notorious for implementing its death threats against persons who are in the opposite
fence.” See Admin. Rec. at 11, ¶ 18. The IJ’s Oral Decision, however, indicates that she
did, in fact, consider Fazil’s submissions, which included information about the Lashkare-Tayyaba organization, including specific news articles Fazil submitted noting that the
“fundamentalist organization utilizes terrorism in order to effect its platform.” See id. at
54. With such a limited challenge, we can find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
5

BIA in concluding that Fazil failed to identify any error in the IJ’s ultimate finding that
petitioner had not met his burden of demonstrating that any harm he allegedly
experienced was on account of a protected ground, and thus in denying his
reconsideration motion.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
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